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Do Better Informed Investors Always Do Better?
A Buyback Puzzle
Abstract
We explore the value of private investment information using data from a singular
source: auctions of yearling racehorses. Horse breeders possess superior information
about their own horses and have strong financial incentives to buy the best of these
back at auction. However, those they repurchase subsequently perform significantly
worse on average, earning 30% less at the racetrack than horses purchased by out-
siders. Moreover, this under-performance is concentrated in male horses, despite
these being purchased exclusively for racing purposes. These puzzling findings can-
not be explained by differences in horse risk or breeder abilities, or by non-financial
objectives, or by behavioral or selection biases.
JEL classification: G02, G11, G14, L83, D44
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Do Better Informed Investors Always Do Better?
A Buyback Puzzle
A little knowledge is a dangerous thing.
Traditional misquotation of Alexander Pope
1 Introduction
A widely-accepted principle of economics is that the possession of private information is
beneficial. As Porter (1995, p1) puts it:
“If one buyer has access to information superior to that of its rivals, such as a
more precise signal of the item’s worth on a future resale market, informational
rents may be obtained.”
In a well-known example, Hendricks and Porter (1988) find that more informed bidders in
oil and gas lease auctions subsequently earn significantly greater profits than do their less
informed competitors. In a different setting, Levitt and Syverson (2008) report evidence
that real estate agents use their superior information about housing markets to earn excess
returns when they sell their own houses.
In this paper, we offer a counter-example. We examine data from a market that offers
uncertain investment payoffs to asymmetrically-informed investors: auctions of yearling
standardbred racehorses in New Zealand (NZ). In this setting, horse breeders sell untried
colts and fillies to aspiring racehorse owners. Two features are important. First, a number
of breeders also race horses on their own behalf and so are both sellers and buyers. Second,
only yearlings sold at these auctions become eligible to compete in a subsequent high-stakes
(approximately $1 million per season) series of races for two- and three-year old horses. As
a result, breeders sometimes offer their own horses for sale at auction and then buy them
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back at the same auction, i.e., they pay administrative and auctioneer fees in order to
retain the option to enter the horse in races with high prize money if it turns out to be of
sufficiently high quality.
At the time of each auction, the horses being sold have not yet appeared on the racetrack,
or even commenced training. Investment in such horses is highly risky — many turn out to
be be either slow, unmotivated, or unsound. Nevertheless, having been able to observe each
horse for at least 12 months between birth and sale date, breeders have private information
about every horse they offer for sale — about its ease of movement, paddock behavior,
tractability, manners, medical history and other factors that can help predict future racing
potential. In principle, they should then be able to exploit this information advantage
to obtain superior estimates of fundamental value, and hence repurchase the horses that
subsequently perform best, at least on average.
However, using data on 1581 horses sold at auction over a three-year period, we find
that horses purchased by their own breeders (“buybacks”) have significantly lower average
racetrack earnings than do horses bought by outsiders (“non-buybacks”). After controlling
for auction price (as an indicator of intrinsic horse quality), and other variables that might
affect racetrack success, this negative relationship between performance and the possession
of private information is confirmed: on average, buybacks earn approximately 30% less
than non-buybacks, despite purchasers of the former having an information advantage.
Such a puzzling finding invites explanation. We explore the possibility that buybacks
are less risky investments, or offer economies of scope, or exist to serve different performance
objectives, or incur lower operating or opportunity costs. We ask if breeders who repurchase
their own horses have low abilities that mitigate their information advantage, or suffer
from common cognitive biases. We also address various statistical issues that might cause
buyback under-performance to be spurious. However, none of these potential explanations
for buyback under-performance receives much support.
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The association of inferior performance with superior information is an unusual one in
economics. In a wide variety of settings (e.g., auction outcomes, corporate investment and
control, cost of capital, market microstructure), information is important because it allows
rational investors to make better decisions. The results of this paper describe a situation
in which investors with more information make seemingly-worse decisions.
In the next section, we describe our data and undertake some preliminary analysis. Sec-
tion 3 contains our main results, while section 4 considers a variety of possible explanations.
We offer some concluding remarks in section 5.
2 Data and Preliminary Analysis
In this section, we first describe the collection of our data and outline some of its properties.
We then undertake some preliminary analysis of the difference between buybacks and non-
buybacks.
2.1 Price and performance data
We use data from six auctions of standardbred yearlings (i.e., horses that are 12–18 months
old) conducted during 2005–2007. In February of each year, there are two separate auctions:
the Australasian Classic Yearling Sale (held in Auckland) and the New Zealand Premier
Yearling Sale (Christchurch). Together, they provide the bulk of the future racing stock
for what is a sizable industry; for example, in 2005 there were 2360 races (i) offering
total stakes of approximately $23 million and (ii) attracting approximately $160 million in
betting turnover across the three most popular pools.1
In these six auctions, a total of 1741 horses were offered for sale. Of these, we exclude
1All monetary values are in NZ dollars. For a more detailed description of the NZ standardbred racing
industry, see Boyle et al. (2010).
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160 from the sample either because they were withdrawn prior to auction (128), or failed
to sell (17), or died before reaching racing age (14), or were still racing on the sample cutoff
date of 31 July 2016 (1), leaving a final sample of 1581 sales made to 653 unique buyers by
499 unique sellers.2
Some summary details regarding these transactions appear in Table 1. The greater
number of unique buyers means that average sales per buyer (2.4; median = 1.0) is smaller
than for sellers (3.2; median = 2.0). In addition, the maximum number of sales by a
single seller is 43, while the busiest buyer purchased 36 yearlings over the three year period
covered by our sample. Among sellers, 6.4% were involved in 10 or more transactions,
compared with only 3.5% of buyers. The smaller representation of buyers at the high-
activity end of the transaction distribution is unsurprising, insofar as the racing of horses
only rarely constitutes the primary source of a buyer’s business or income. By contrast, a
greater proportion of sellers are associated with professional breeding companies who sell
in significant quantities.
For each yearling sold, we obtained data on auction price, breeder, buyer, sex and name
from the website of PGG Wrightson, the auctioneer. Data on subsequent horse ownership,
training, and racing performance were hand collected from the Harness Racing New Zealand
(HRNZ, the governing body of NZ standardbred racing) website, which contains detailed
information, in the InfoHorse section, on the owners, trainers, and performance of every
standardbred horse that has raced in NZ since 1985.3
2The NZ racing season runs from 1 August to 31 July, so the youngest horses in the sample (those
sold in the 2007 auctions) turned 11 years old the day after the sample cutoff date. The only horse in our
sample still actively racing in NZ on that date was a soon-to-be 12 year old non-buyback who, in 198 starts
over 9 seasons, had earned $108,480. Neither the exclusion of this horse from the sample, or the 14 horses
who died young, has any effect on our results.
3For the PGG Wrightson data, see http://standardbred.pggwrightson.co.nz/Sales/Results. The HRNZ
information can be accessed at http://harness.hrnz.co.nz/gws/ws/r/infohorsews/wsd08x.
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Table 1: Sales and Purchases of Yearling Horses
Sellers Buyers






1 Transaction 219 397
2 Transactions 120 115
3 Transactions 48 49
4 Transactions 33 27
5–9 Transactions 47 42
10–19 Transactions 22 12
20+ Transactions 10 11
As well as organizing the auctions, PGG Wrightson also sponsor a major series of races
for two- and three-year old horses, known as the PGG Wrightson NZ Yearling Sales Series,
that offers approximately $1 million in stakes each year spread over six races. Eligibility
for this series – the most valuable available to two- and three-year old horses in NZ – is
restricted to horses sold via the Australasian Classic and New Zealand Premier auctions.
Although only 2% of horses sold through these sales subsequently qualify for the associated
race series), this arrangement provides an obvious incentive for breeders to offer their best
horses for auction and then seek to buy them back.
This feature distinguishes our setting from that of Chezum and Wimmer (1997), who
examine United States auctions of thoroughbred yearlings. They find evidence of an adverse
selection problem: breeders who also race horses on their own account have an incentive to
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auction only their less promising yearlings while keeping those with the greatest potential
at home. Buyers respond by paying lower average prices for the yearlings offered by such
breeders. By contrast, the environment we examine has a very different incentive structure:
the race eligibility criterion means that breeders who also race horses are incentivized to
put their most highly regarded yearlings up for auction and then seek to buy them back.
Prior to the auction, prospective buyers can study the auction catalogue (which contains
information on yearling name, breeding, color, sex, and breeder) and are usually able to
inspect any horses they are potentially interested in purchasing. At the auction itself,
buyers see the horse when it enters the auction ring. Breeders not only have all this
information, but have also had the opportunity to observe the horse in various situations
(e.g., in the paddock, in the barn, in contact with other horses, traveling) over a period of
at least 12 months.4 Although we are not aware of any direct evidence that this additional
information has predictive power for a horse’s future racetrack performance, it appears to
be a commonly-held view. For instance, Chezum and Wimmer (1997, p521) note that:
In the roughly one-and-a-half years before the seller takes a yearling to auction,
he or she is able to observe how a yearling responds to other yearlings, has access
to the yearling’s complete medical history, and generally identifies the yearling’s
temperament. While these factors do not perfectly predict the yearling’s future
on-track success, they do give the seller an informational advantage.
Similarly, Kirkpatrick (2001) argues that private information on conformation, athleticism
and medical history are important determinants of a horse’s true value. Auction partici-
pants seem to agree: using a small private database on thoroughbred yearlings, Eberhart
(2009) reports evidence consistent with Kirkpatrick’s claim. In addition, Wimmer and
Chezum (2003) find that yearling certification (an auction house quality guarantee that
4They are not, however, allowed to commence any formal training of these horses.
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Table 2: Buyback versus Non-Buyback Purchases of Yearling Horses
Buyback Purchases








essentially communicates the private information of breeders) eliminates the adverse selec-
tion discount of Chezum and Wimmer, suggesting that auction participants believe that
breeders possess an information advantage.
Table 2 contains information about the breakdown between buyback and non-buyback
sales. We initially define a buyback purchase as occurring when a breeder repurchases one
of his own horses at auction and subsequently retains it for racing. In our sample, 18.8%
(298) of the horses sold at auction fit this criterion, and this percentage is common to both
auction locations.5 There is also very little difference across years, with buybacks ranging
from a low of 17.7% in 2006 to a high of 19.9% in 2005. Overall, buyback propensity
appears to be a systematic phenomenon.
Table 3 provides some summary statistics on price and racetrack performance. The
typical yearling sells for slightly less than $23,000, with buybacks being approximately
$5400 cheaper than non-buybacks on average. Variation in price is considerable – from a
5The 298 buybacks were made by 207 different breeders. Of these, 158 repurchased one of their own
horses, 27 bought two, 10 bought three, 7 bought four, 3 bought five, and 1 each bought six and seven
respectively.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for Horse Prices and Performance
Full Sample Buyback Non-Buyback
(N=1581) (N=298) (N=1283)
Mean Minimum Maximum Mean Mean p-value
[Median] [Median] [Median]
Price $22,932 $1000 $210,000 $18,581 $23,942 0.00
[$15,000] [$12,500] [$16,000] 0.00
Career Earnings $22,503 $0 $2,426,765 $12,667 $24,787 0.00
[$2325] [$1409] [$2613] 0.03
Career Return 1.267 $0 111.48 0.895 1.354 0.03
[0.118] [0.069] [0.122] 0.02
Portfolio Career Return 0.981 0.682 1.742
Notes: Career Earnings is the horse’s lifetime racetrack winnings. Career Return is the horse’s lifetime
racetrack winnings divided by the auction price, i.e., Career Earnings/Price. Portfolio Career Return is
the sum of career earnings for all horses in the relevant sample divided by the sum of their prices. p-values
for the difference between buybacks and non-buybacks are based on the t-test (means) and the van der
Waerdan test (medians).
low of $1000 to a high of $210,000.
Our first, and primary, measure of performance is the horse’s career earnings in NZ.
In our sample, the average yearling earns a little over $22,500 at the racetrack but this
reflects considerable variation: career winnings range from $0 (the fate of 36.6% of horses
in our sample) to over $2 million. Unsurprisingly, the distribution is highly right-skewed:
the median horse earns only $2325. Career earnings is also strongly correlated with price:
the Pearson correlation is 0.19 (t-statistic = 6.01), suggesting that price contains useful
information about future racing performance.
More interesting is the difference between buybacks and non-buybacks. Surprisingly,
the average buyback horse earns little more than 50% of that earned by its non-buyback
counterpart – $12,667 versus $24,787. The difference in medians is similar – $1409 versus
$2613. Breeders apparently repurchase less successful racehorses.
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A horse’s career earnings are an indicator of its racing quality, which is of primary
importance to yearling buyers who are motivated by the desire to own a “champion” (see,
for example, DeGennaro, 2003). However, some auction bidders may have more mundane
financial preferences, and even a mediocre racehorse can be a worthwhile investment if
bought at a low enough price. As an alternative performance measure, we therefore di-
vide career earnings by auction price to yield an approximate indicator of the return on
investment that a horse provides.
Figure 1 shows that these two performance measures are closely related (Pearson corre-
lation = 0.91; t-statistic = 67.6) for the sub-sample of horses with positive career earnings.
Unsurprisingly, therefore, Table 3 reveals that buybacks also under-perform according to
the career return measure — both the mean and median are more than 50% higher for
non-buybacks. Thus, in our sample, a faster horse is typically also a better investment.6
Buyback under-performance can be seen even more vividly in Figure 2. For both buy-
backs and non-buybacks, we sort the data into auction price quintiles and estimate average
performance within each quintile. For both performance measures, Figure 2 reveals that
the under-performance of breeder buybacks is a feature of the entire price range: in each
quintile, buybacks are noticeably less successful than non-buybacks.
Overall, the picture painted by these summary statistics is one of breeders choosing
to repurchase horses that subsequently under-perform, despite having information that
gives them an advantage in identifying animals that out-perform. However, both career
earnings and career return are, from an owner’s perspective, only partial measures of horse
performance. Ideally, we would also incorporate the ongoing costs of racehorse ownership
and any gains from subsequent resale, since both can obviously have a significant effect
6For the measure of career return relevant to a perfectly-diversified investor (the sum of career earnings
for all horses divided by the sum of their prices), a similar pattern applies: 0.981 for the full sample, 0.682





















Figure 1: Scatterplot of career earnings and career return performance variables (in natural






















Figure 2: Performance by Price Quintile. Panel (a) depicts average career earnings sorted from
lowest to highest price quintile; Panel (b) depicts average career return sorted from lowest to highest price
quintile.
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on the total return to owners. Unfortunately, we have no direct information on either of
these variables. To the extent that buybacks are less costly to race, or are more likely to
be subsequently sold for a significant sum, this could change our results. In subsequent
sections, we attempt to address the resale issue by adjusting our analysis for horses that are
exported (section 3.1), or re-sold subsequent to auction (section 4.4.3). We also investigate
the cost issue by analyzing horse earnings per season raced (section 4.7.2).
In addition to these considerations, there may be other variables affecting performance
that are correlated with the buyback decision; there may also be straightforward expla-
nations for buyback under-performance. We take up the first of these issues in section 3
before proceeding to the second in section 4.
2.2 What predicts the likelihood of a buyback?
Before undertaking a more detailed examination of buyback under-performance, we first
address a simpler question: what predicts whether a horse is repurchased by its breeder or
not? As well as providing a fuller picture of our data, the answers to such a question have
the potential to shed light on potential determinants of the phenomenon in which we are
primarily interested: buyback under-performance.
In general, we might expect the likelihood of a horse being a buyback to depend on (i)
horse characteristics and (ii) buyer characteristics. We consider several examples of each
that are available in our dataset.
Focusing first on horse characteristics, we have already seen (Table 3) that buybacks
are associated with a lower average auction price. Our dataset also contains information
on horse gender (filly versus colt) and on whether or not a horse is subsequently exported
to another country (primarily to Australia or the United States). Both are potentially
informative about the buyback decision: fillies may be repurchased in order to ensure future
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breeding stock, while buybacks may in part be motivated by a desire to subsequently on-
sell the horses to overseas buyers at an attractive price. We therefore create two dummy
variables: Filly — set equal to 1 if the horse is a filly (539 observations in our sample) and
0 otherwise; and Export — set equal to 1 if the horse is exported prior to turning four
years old (270 observations) and 0 otherwise.
Turning to buyer characteristics, an obvious candidate is the size of the breeding oper-
ation selling the horse. Large professional breeders are likely to have incentives that differ
from those of small hobby breeders, potentially seeing them repurchase their own horses at
a higher or lower frequency. We measure the size of a breeding operation with the variable
Breeder Sales — the total number of auction sales made by the horse’s breeder during our
sample period (see Table 1 for the underlying distribution).
Also, some auction bidders make use of agents acting on their behalf, possibly in order
to conceal the bidder’s identity and not reveal private information, which would seem to be
particularly important for buybacks. We therefore create another dummy variable: Agent
— set equal to 1 if the successful auction bidder uses an agent to purchase the horse (117
such occurrences in our sample) and 0 otherwise.
We are also able to obtain information on buyer gender, although this is not entirely
straightforward. The auction results list buyer names, but provide no direct indication of
gender. In some cases, such as where the buyer is “Mrs Smith”, gender is obvious. In other
cases, such as where the buyer is “R Smith” or “Robin Smith”, things are not so clear.
Some buyers are able to be identified via the HRNZ website (if they have some professional
involvement in the industry), but this is a minority. Our approach is to create a dummy
variable Female Buyer that is set equal to 1 if the horse buyer is listed as “Miss”, “Ms”,
or “Mrs”, or has an obviously female first name (e.g., Charlotte), or is otherwise known by
us to be female, and 0 otherwise. Where a horse purchase is made jointly, we classify the
buyer as female if at least 50% of the buyers are women. The buyers of 127 horses in our
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Table 4: Summary Statistics for Other Variables
All Export Filly Agent Female Buyer
(N=1581) (N=270) (N=539) (N=117) (N=127)
A. Price & Performance
Price ($) 22,932 26,431 19,980 24,709 17,612
[15,000] [18,000] [13,335] [16,500] [11,000]
Career Earnings ($) 22,503 4203 14,966 15,685 19,902
[2325] [0.00] [696] [5727] [782]
B. Representation
Full Sample 100% 17.1% 34.1% 7.4% 8.0%
Buyback 100% 13.4% 41.9% 13.1% 20.5%
Non-Buyback 100% 17.9% 32.2% 6.1% 5.1%
p−value NA 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Panel A reports price and performance means (with medians in square brackets). Panel B shows
percentage representations in the various sub-samples. For example, 17.1% of horses in the full sample
are exported prior to their fourth birthday, compared with 13.4% (17.9%) in the buyback (non-buyback)
sub-sample. p−values are based on a z-test of the difference in sample representation between buybacks
and non-buybacks.
sample meet these criteria and are classified as female.
Summary statistics for all four dummy variables appear in Table 4. Horses that are
exported early in their racing career unsurprisingly earn less on NZ racetracks than other
horses, but are sold at a relatively high average price. Although horses purchased via
agents also sell for a relatively high average price, they too experience lower-than-average
earnings (but higher median earnings). Fillies, and horses purchased by female bidders,
sell for relatively low prices and have relatively low average earnings.7 Table 4 also reveals
that all four characteristics are strongly associated with the buyback decision. Buybacks
7In addition, breeding operation size has little impact on average price but larger size is associated with
mild out-performance. For example, horses offered by breeders with just one sale in our sample sold for an
average price of $22,947 and had average career earnings of $19,839, while horses offered by breeders with
more than 20 sales in our sample sold for an average price of $24,285 and had average career earnings of
$26,877. We return to this point in section 4.4.2.
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p-value (LR-stat) 0.00 0.00
Notes: Both logit models use 1581 observations and allow for fixed auction year and location effects. All
reported coefficients are marginal effects. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at
the breeder level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. The last
two rows provide McFadden’s pseudo-R2 and likelihood-ratio probability values respectively.
are more likely to be fillies (41.9% of buybacks versus 32.2% of non-buybacks), purchased
via an agent (13.1% versus 6.1%), and to have a female buyer (20.5% versus 5.1%), and,
more weakly, less likely to be subsequently exported (13.4% versus 17.9%).
To incorporate the continuous variables (Price and Breeder Sales), we estimate logit
models where the dependent variable is Buyback, which equals 1 if the horse is a buyback
and 0 otherwise. The results appear in Table 5 (all reported coefficients are marginal
effects); column (1) includes only the horse characteristics as covariates; column (2) adds
in buyer characteristics. With the exception of Export, which is not significantly associated
with the buyback decision, the results are similar to the univariate findings of Table 4: fillies,
and horses purchased via an agent or by a female bidder are more likely to be buybacks
(greater probabilities of 0.041, 0.119 and 0.211 respectively). High-priced horses and horses
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bred by large operations are less likely to be buybacks.8 In subsequent sections, we consider
how each of these variables could potentially contribute to buyback under-performance and
assess the extent to which they do.
3 The Buyback Puzzle: Evidence
3.1 Principal result
We first estimate OLS regression models of the general form:
Career Earnings = α0 + α1Buyback +
∑
i
βiControli + ε (1)
where each Controli is a variable that potentially influences subsequent horse racetrack
performance. We also include dummies for auction location and year. We allow for clus-
tering by estimating robust standard errors at the breeder level. Our primary interest is in
the estimate of α1, the additional horse winnings associated with breeder repurchases: if
the partial information possessed by breeders about their own horses is valuable, then this
coefficient should be positive.
In equation (1), the dependent variable is the dollar value of the horse’s subsequent
racetrack performance, the expected value of which depends on a myriad of factors —
breeding, size, speed, conformation, heart score, temperament, tractability, and so on.
Although these variables are not directly observable to us, their combined importance
should be reflected in the horse’s auction price (see, for example, Chezum and Wimmer,
1997): horses that command a higher price at auction are expected to be of higher quality
and should subsequently perform better on the racetrack.
8A horse sold by a breeder who auctions 10 horses is approximately 0.045 less likely to be a buyback
(relative to the full-sample buyback likelihood of 0.188) than a similar horse offered by a breeder who
auctions 1 horse. Similarly, a horse sold for $20,000 is 0.030 less likely to be a buyback than a horse sold
for $2000.
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Table 6: Horse Performance and Incomplete Information
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 19745∗∗ 23532∗∗∗ 23211∗∗ 27979∗∗∗ 21170∗∗∗ 2.095∗∗∗
(8662) (9016) (9601) (10074) (4128) (0.399)
Buyback −9641∗∗∗ −10593∗∗∗ −8861∗∗∗ −9691∗∗∗ −9611∗∗∗ −0.515∗∗
(3198) (3227) (3086) (3112) (3139) (0.206)
Price 0.469∗∗∗ 0.496∗∗∗ 0.451∗∗∗ 0.476∗∗∗ 0.492∗∗∗ −1.4E-05∗∗
(0.127) (0.129) (0.126) (0.128) (0.137) (5.6E-06)
Export −24740∗∗∗ −26097∗∗∗ −26063∗∗∗ −1.379∗∗∗
(3663) (3979) (3982) (0.213)
Filly −9084∗∗ −11110∗∗∗ −10805∗∗∗ −0.744∗∗∗
(3618) (3774) (3685) (0.247)
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
R2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02
F -statistic 5.04∗∗∗ 6.57∗∗∗ 4.70∗∗∗ 6.27∗∗∗ 10.33∗∗∗ 4.14∗∗∗
Notes: In columns (1)-(5), the dependent variable is Career Earnings; in column (6) it is Career Return.
Fixed effects models include dummies for location and year of auction. Numbers in parentheses are robust
standard errors clustered at the breeder level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels respectively.
The results from controlling for auction price appear in column (1) of Table 6. Overall
explanatory power is low, reflecting the high idiosyncratic risk associated with yearling
purchases. Despite this, high-priced yearlings do subsequently perform better, although
every additional dollar spent on buying a yearling at auction generates less than $0.50
on average. More interestingly, controlling for auction price, and therefore expected horse
quality, explains little of the puzzling discrepancy between the earnings of buybacks and
non-buybacks: horses that are repurchased by their breeders earn $9641 less on average, a
finding that is statistically significant at the 1% level.
Two additional factors potentially complicate this simple relationship. First, as previ-
ously discussed in section 2.2, a number of horses in our sample (270) are exported while
still relatively young, but our performance measure includes only stakes won while owned
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and trained in NZ. Such horses will obviously appear less successful according to such a
measure. Second, female horses (fillies) are often retired early due to having been bought
just as much for future breeding reasons as for racetrack performance.
Table 4 confirms that both exports and fillies have considerably lower mean and median
earnings than other horses. Moreover, as discussed in section 2.2, buybacks are less likely to
be exported than non-buybacks and more likely to be fillies. Motivated by these findings,
columns (2)-(5) of Table 6 contain results from including the Export and Filly dummy
variables in equation (1). Fillies and horses that are exported early in their racing careers
both earn significantly less than average, but this has little effect on the buyback puzzle:
the average shortfall is above $8800 in all specifications. Setting other variables equal to
their sample means, these dollar shortfalls correspond to buyback under-performance of
30% or more. Column (6) of Table 6 employs career return as the dependent variable
and the results are very similar. Buybacks appear to be both inferior horses and inferior
investments.
3.2 Data issues
Before proceeding further, we wish to be confident that buyback under-performance is not
a spurious phenomenon attributable to certain characteristics of our data. We discuss four
ways by which this might occur.
3.2.1 Outliers
The top-performing horse in our sample (racetrack earnings of over $2.4 million) is a non-
buyback, raising the possibility that buyback under-performance is due to the presence of a
small number of outliers. To address this concern, we successively remove high-performing
horses from the sample and re-estimate equation (1). Specifically, we first remove horses
earning more than $2 million (1 non-buyback), then those earning more than $1 million
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(3 non-buybacks), then those earning more than $500,000 (8 non-buybacks, 1 buyback),
and finally those earning more than $250,000 (13 non-buybacks, 2 buybacks). Note that
such a procedure is biased towards eliminating buyback under-performance since it deletes
high-earning non-buybacks at a rate significantly greater than their overall appearance in
the sample. Despite this, buyback under-performance remains strong in all these cases.
For example, when horses with earnings greater than $500,000 are excluded, the estimated
buyback coefficient is -$5907 (p-value = 0.0005). Buyback under-performance does not
seem to be the result of an outlier problem.
3.2.2 Non-normal performance distributions
Although outliers may not be an issue, our performance variables are highly right-skewed
and the Jacques-Bera test strongly rejects normality (the same is true of the regression
residuals in the Table 6 models). Although there is some debate about the importance of
non-normality in large samples (see, for example, Lumley et al., 2002), conventional wisdom
suggests that standard t-statistics may be unreliable. In short, buyback under-performance
could be spurious.
With positive-valued data, the standard solution for skewness is to take the natural log.
However, this is not feasible here due to the large number of zeros in our performance data.
Instead, we adopt the Generalized Linear Model (GLM) approach suggested by Knüpfer
et al. (2017) and Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006). This approach estimates the Poisson
regression model:




using a quasi-maximum likelihood estimator with Huber-White standard errors; as dis-
cussed by Santos Silva and Tenreyro, this approach produces consistent parameter esti-
mates when the dependent variable is continuous, skewed, non-negative, and contains a
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Table 7: Horse Performance and Incomplete Information: GLM Estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 9.993∗∗∗ 10.137∗∗∗ 10.137∗∗∗ 10.314∗∗∗ 10.055∗∗∗ 0.922∗∗∗
(0.366) (0.370) (0.398) (0.405) (0.166) (0.270)
Buyback −0.588∗∗∗ −0.628∗∗∗ −0.551∗∗ −0.576∗∗∗ −0.561∗∗∗ −0.465∗∗
(0.232) (0.231) (0.227) (0.225) (0.226) (0.191)
Price 1.2E-05∗∗∗ 1.3E-05∗∗∗ 1.2E-05∗∗∗ 1.3E-05∗∗∗ 1.3E-05∗∗∗ −1.6E-05∗∗
(1.9E-06) (2.0E-06) (2.0E-06) (2.1E-06) (2.2E-06) (6.5E-06)
Export −1.950∗∗∗ −1.991∗∗∗ −1.990∗∗∗ −2.077∗∗∗
(0.231) (0.231) (0.232) (0.210)
Filly −0.485∗∗∗ −0.550∗∗∗ −0.544∗∗∗ −0.639∗∗∗
(0.193) (0.193) (0.190) (0.171)
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Pseudo-R2 0.06 0.12 0.08 0.14 0.13 0.27
p-value (LR-stat) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Re-estimation of the Table 6 models using GLM with a log link in order to simultaneously allow
for skewness and zeros in the Career Earnings and Career Return variables. Numbers in parentheses are
Huber-White standard errors. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
non-trivial number of zeros.9
The results generated by this approach appear in Table 7. The overall picture is very
similar to Table 6, with buybacks performing significantly worse than non-buybacks. Quan-
titatively, estimated under-performance is also of a similar magnitude, e.g., the marginal
effect for buybacks in column (4) is approximately -$12,962, compared to -$9691 when
estimated by OLS.10 Due to the similarity of the results generated by the two estimation
methods, we henceforth report only the more easily-interpretable OLS models.
9More formally, this procedure is known as GLM with a logarithmic link function. For a simple
discussion, see Gould (2011).
10The approximate marginal effect in column (4) is the buyback coefficient estimate (-0.576) times
average career earnings ($22,503) = $12,962.
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3.2.3 Fixed year and location effects
The models reported in columns (1)–(4) of Table 6 include fixed effects for possible variation
in the expected performance of horses sold in different years and locations. The downside
to this approach is that it assumes the performance-buyback relationship is the same in
all cases. To check that the Table 6 results are not driven by a single year or location,
we re-estimate the base model (column (4)) for each year and sale location separately.
The estimated buyback shortfall is economically large and statistically significant for both
locations (average estimate = -$12,028; average t-statistic = 2.50); the same is true for the
2005 and 2006 years, but not for 2007 (average estimate = -$10,035; average t-statistic =
2.01). Thus, with the exception of 2007 sales, individual location or year regressions yield
a similar degree of buyback under-performance as the full-sample regression.
3.3 Summary
To summarize our evidence to this point, after controlling for price, gender, and resale
to foreign buyers, and for possible statistical problems, we continue to obtain the result
suggested by Table 3 and Figure 2: auction bidders with better information systematically
buy horses that subsequently perform worse. That successful auction bidders can be subject
to a “winner’s curse” is no surprise — see Thaler (1988). What is surprising here is that
the curse is greater for the more informed group of investors. This stands in stark contrast
to results obtained by other authors. For instance, Hendricks et al. (1987) and Hendricks
and Porter (1988) examine the sale of offshore oil and gas tracts by the United States.
They find that firms which own tracts adjacent to those being auctioned, and are thus
presumably better informed, subsequently achieve significantly higher profits than non-
neighbor firms. Similarly, Dionne et al. (2015) show that target firm blockholders, who
are presumably better informed about the firm’s prospects, earn higher returns than other
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bidders in corporate acquisitions.
In the spirit of these earlier papers, we emphasize that the puzzling feature of our results
is not that buyback breeders merely fail to exploit their information advantage. A failure
to find any evidence of superior performance by buyback horses could easily be attributed
to breeder private information being insufficient to offer them an observable advantage,
particularly given the uncertainty about subsequent racehorse performance. Instead, the
puzzle is that horses repurchased by their breeders actually perform worse on average.
Even if the information possessed by breeders is of epsilon value, we know of no economic
theory which suggests that it should result in inferior returns. In the next section, we turn
our attention to this issue.
4 The Buyback Puzzle: Possible Explanations
Why do investors with an information advantage choose investments that seemingly under-
perform? In this section, we consider a number of possible explanations for this puzzling
phenomenon. First, we ask whether buyback motivation differs between colts and fillies and
find that under-performance is unexpectedly concentrated in colt buybacks, thus identifying
a further puzzle. Second, we look for differences in risk and skewness between buybacks
and non-buybacks, but find no evidence that such differences exist. Third, we investigate
whether buyback breeders differ from their contemporaries along a variety of dimensions
— ability, preferences and objectives, behavioral biases, and auction bidding strategies —
that could potentially explain buyback under-performance, but find no evidence that this
is the case. Fourth, we consider the possibility that buybacks systematically have lower
ongoing costs or receive lower quality inputs, but this too receives no support from the
data. Finally, we allow for the possibility that the true opportunity cost faced by buyback
breeders is less than the price paid at auction, but this turns out to have only a minor
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effect on the buyback puzzle.
4.1 Reinvestment by breeders
One obvious explanation for the observed under-performance of buybacks is suggested by
the organizational structure of the breeding industry. Because horses are finite-lived assets,
breeding firms must frequently reinvest in their broodmare stocks if they are to continue
to operate; that is, they need, at a minimum, to replace their female horses that die or
become too old to continue breeding. One simple way of doing so, especially if they wish
to retain access to a particular breeding family, is to keep the fillies they breed themselves.
However, an additional consideration is that two- and three-year old fillies are able to race
primarily against their own sex and thus, if they have sufficient ability, to earn considerable
sums at the racetrack by being eligible for the PGG Wrightson series, for example. Thus,
breeders who enter both male and female horses in the auctions may use different criteria for
their buyback decisions: colts are repurchased based solely on their racing potential, while
breeding potential is at least a partial consideration for fillies. Put another way, colts are
bought back for income purposes only, while both income and reinvestment considerations
are relevant for fillies.
All this suggests that breeders will overlook limited racing potential in a filly if it has
strong breeding potential, and hence are more likely to repurchase fillies that subsequently
under-perform at the racetrack. Moreover, even if a filly turns out to be a quality racehorse,
its breeding potential means that retirement from the racetrack is likely to occur sooner
than for a colt of equal ability (breeding opportunities are rare for male horses), and hence
will end up with lower career earnings. In short, to the extent that breeder repurchases of
their female horses are motivated partly by a need to replenish their breeding stock, the
estimate of buyback under-performance is likely to be biased downwards by the inclusion
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F -statistic 4.30∗∗∗ 5.82∗∗∗
Notes: The dependent variable is career earnings. All models include auction year and sales location fixed
effects. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the breeder level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
of fillies in our buyback variable.
To examine this issue, we re-estimate equation (1) with separate dummies for male
and female buybacks. If breeder reinvestment is the cause of the buyback puzzle, then
under-performance should be concentrated in the filly repurchases. However, as can be
seen in Table 8, distinguishing between male and female buybacks actually exacerbates
the puzzle — it is male buybacks that under-perform while female buybacks perform on a
par with non-buybacks. When auction price is the only control variable (column (1)), the
average shortfall of male buybacks is a statistically significant (at the 1% level) -$13,373;
for female buybacks, by contrast, the average shortfall is insignificantly different from zero.
When the export and filly controls are added (column (2)), the average male shortfall
balloons out to -$18,050 while the female equivalent is actually positive (albeit statistically
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insignificant). Clearly, lumping all buybacks, both male and female, together results in an
under-statement of buyback under-performance.
Table 8 reveals that there are in fact two buyback puzzles: one, that buyback horses
under-perform; two, that this under-performance is restricted to male horses, contrary to
what breeder incentives would suggest. Any successful explanation must, therefore, be
capable of resolving both puzzles. Because the second puzzle (only male buybacks under-
perform) is both more puzzling and economically bigger, we henceforth follow a two-step
procedure. First, we investigate whether or not a potential explanation is able to resolve
the weaker first puzzle; if it does, we then ask whether it can also resolve the stronger
second puzzle.
4.2 Risk
When two assets are observed to offer different average returns, a natural presumption (at
least to economists) is that this reflects a corresponding difference in the risks of the two
assets. According to this view, the apparent under-performance of buyback horses can be
explained by these horses being less risky investments than non-buybacks.
On initial inspection, such an explanation seems improbable. Asset pricing theory em-
phasizes the importance of systematic risk, and the probability of a horse turning out to
be a good racetrack performer is unlikely to depend on the state of the stockmarket or
aggregate consumption. However, as Merton (1987) and Cochrane (2005, p37) emphasize,
an asset’s unsystematic risk will also be priced when its size renders diversification imprac-
tical. As racehorses are lumpy assets that are difficult, and costly, to diversify, total risk
(the sum of systematic and unsystematic risk), or dispersion, is potentially relevant.
To estimate career earnings dispersion, we use two non-parametric dispersion measures
recommended by statisticians for dealing with highly skewed and non-normal distributions:
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Table 9: Do Differences in Risk Explain Buyback Under-Performance?
Buyback Non-Buyback
Inter-quartile ratio 8.98 6.78
Coefficient of dispersion 9.79 9.55
Coefficient of variation 3.47 4.39
Pr(Career Earnings = 0) 0.40 0.36
Pr(Career Earnings < Price) 0.78 0.75
Pr(Career Earnings < 2*Price) 0.89 0.86
Skewness 11.5 13.7
Notes: The inter-quartile ratio equals the inter-quartile range divided by the median; the coefficient of
dispersion equals the mean absolute deviation from the median divided by the median; the coefficient of
variation equals the standard deviation divided by the mean. Pr(Career Earnings < X) is the sample
probability that career earnings are less than X. Skewness is the sample estimate of standardized skewness
for the career earnings variable.
the inter-quartile ratio (Francis, 2008) and the coefficient of dispersion (Gastwirth, 1982,
1988; Bonett and Seier, 2006). For completeness, we also report the coefficient of variation,
although the non-normal nature of the career earnings distribution suggests this measure
should be viewed with some caution. In addition, motivated by the evidence of Olsen
(1997) that investors care more about downside risk than dispersion, we also estimate the
probability of career earnings being (i) equal to zero, (ii) less than the auction price, (iii)
less than double the auction price.
However, as Table 9 shows, there is little support for the idea that buyback horses are
less risky. Although the coefficient of variation is lower for buybacks (3.47 vs 4.39), both
the inter-quartile ratio and the coefficient of dispersion are higher (8.98 vs 6.78 and 9.79 vs
9.55 respectively). Moreover, the downside risk measures are all higher for buybacks.
Buyback under-performance could be due to differences in higher-order risk measures.
Racehorses are essentially lottery stocks — investments with a high probability of a small
payoff together with a low probability of a very large payoff — and hence have high id-
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iosyncratic skewness. Mitton and Vorkink (2007) and Barberis and Huang (2008) show
that certain kinds of investor preferences can lead to a negative relationship between ex-
pected returns and idiosyncratic skewness, and Boyer at al. (2009) and Kumar et al. (2011)
find evidence consistent with this prediction. This suggests an explanation for the lower
average returns of buybacks: that their returns may have greater idiosyncratic skewness
than the returns of non-buybacks. However, this is not supported by our data — the career
earnings standardized-skewness estimate for buybacks is actually lower (11.5) than that for
non-buybacks (13.7).
Overall, we find no evidence that buyback horses offer less risk or more skewness than
non-buyback horses; if anything, the reverse is true. Thus, it seems unlikely that the
under-performance of buybacks is due to risk or skewness differences.
4.3 Heterogenous ability
As Bodnaruk and Simonov (2015) point out, experts can differ along both information
and ability dimensions, and that advantages in one area can be offset by disadvantages
in the other. In this case, breeders, to the extent that they are breeding experts rather
than racing experts, may simply have less ability at identifying promising racehorses than
outside buyers, and that this ability disadvantage outweighs their information advantage.
To investigate this possibility, we examine the performance of horses that buyback
breeders buy from other breeders. We include in our regression model a new dummy
variable (Buyback Buyer) set equal to 1 if the horse is (i) not a buyback and (ii) is bought
by a breeder who makes at least one buyback purchase in our sample, and 0 otherwise. In
our sample, there are 114 such horses; these are bought by 37 breeders, who also repurchase
46 of their own horses. If breeders who engage in buybacks are truly inferior assessors of
horse flesh, then these 114 purchases from other breeders should also perform worse than
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Table 10: Do Differences in Breeder Abilities Explain Buyback Under-Performance?
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 27202∗∗∗ 38906 29040∗∗ 12413∗∗∗
(10253) (23909) (12300) (4267)
Buyback −8704∗∗∗ −25770∗ −10803∗∗ −8323∗∗∗





Price 0.462∗∗∗ 0.684∗∗ 0.477∗∗∗ 0.564∗∗∗
(0.127) (0.343) (0.129) (3.166)
Export −25569∗∗∗ −44540∗∗ −26083∗∗∗ −22851∗∗∗
(3977) (17164) (3976) (4214)
Filly −11526∗∗∗ −23881∗ −11089∗∗∗ −6480∗
(3774) (12308) (3746) (3694)
N 1581 160 1581 900
R2 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.05
F -statistic 5.65∗∗∗ 2.11∗∗ 5.50∗∗∗ 7.24∗∗∗
Notes: The dependent variable is Career Earnings. Columns (1) and (3) use the full sample. Column (2)
uses the sub-sample of 160 horses purchased by breeders who engage in buybacks. Column (4) uses the
sub-sample of 900 horses sold by breeders who engage in buybacks. All models include fixed auction year
and location effects. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the breeder level. ∗∗∗,
∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
other non-buybacks on average.
However, the data reveal little support for this explanation (column (1) of Table 10). In
fact, non-buyback purchases by breeders who also repurchase their own horses out-perform
other non-buybacks on average, although the difference is not statistically significant at
conventional levels. It appears that buyback breeders as a group have similar ability to
other buyers when it comes to identifying promising equine investments, and hence that
ability differences cannot explain the buyback puzzle.11
11Of course, this implicitly assumes the 37 breeders who engage in both buybacks and non-buybacks
are representative of all 207 breeders undertaking the 298 buybacks. This appears to be the case: average
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We also compare the 114 non-buyback purchases by the 37 breeders who also repur-
chase their own horses with the 46 horses these same breeders repurchase from themselves.
Column (2) of Table 10 reveals that the buybacks earn, relative to their breeders’ outside
purchases, $25,770 less on average, although this is only significant at the 10% level. Thus,
even within the small group of breeders who purchase yearlings both from themselves and
from others, there is evidence that buybacks underperform.
A second possibility is that the horses produced by buyback breeders in our sample are
generally inferior to those offered by other breeders. If this were true, then the negative
buyback coefficient in Table 6 would not be evidence of a failure to exploit an information
advantage, but instead simply reflect the poorer quality of all horses offered by buyback
breeders. Put another way, our results might simply be indicating that breeders buy back
the best of a bad bunch.
To test this hypothesis, we create a new dummy variable (Buyback Seller) set equal to
1 if the horse is sold to an outside buyer by a breeder who makes at least one buyback
purchase in our sample, and 0 otherwise. In our sample, there are 689 such horses; these
are sold by 132 breeders who account for 211 buybacks. If breeders who engage in buybacks
produce inferior horses, then these 689 horses they sell to others should also perform worse
on average than the horses produced by other breeders.
However, we find no support for this view either (column (3) of Table 10). Although
horses sold to outside investors by breeders who also repurchase their own horses do under-
perform on average, the extent of this is economically small (-$2077) and statistically
insignificant. On average, buyback breeders appear to produce horses of similar ability to
other breeders, but then retain a disproportionate number of subsequent under-achievers.
career earnings (after adjusting for price and other control variables) of the 46 horses they repurchase
differs by $196 (statistically insignificant) from the other 252 buybacks, but by -$12,911 (significant at the
1% level) from the 1283 non-buybacks. That is, these 46 horses under-perform similarly to other buybacks.
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In short, inferior breeding ability by breeders who repurchase their own horses cannot
explain buyback under-performance.
Finally, we compare the 211 buybacks undertaken by the 132 breeders who also sell to
outsiders with the 689 sold by these breeders to others. Column (4) of Table 10 shows that
horses sold by this group of breeders to themselves (i.e., the buybacks) earn, relative to
their breeders’ outside sales, $8,323 less on average, which is significant at the 1% level. As
we saw above with buyers, the group of breeders who sell yearlings both to themselves and
to others experience buyback under-performance.
4.4 Alternative breeder objectives
Our analysis to this point assumes that racehorse investors have an objective function that
increases monotonically with expected career earnings. It is possible they pursue some
other objective that favors buybacks even at the expense of lower expected career earnings.
4.4.1 Myopia
Perhaps horse investors are myopic and so care more about short-term success than about
total career earnings. Such a focus might be perfectly rational from the perspective of
breeders who engage in buybacks. As previously noted, it is the PGG Wrightson age group
races that provide the immediate incentive for breeders to buy their own horses back at
auction. Moreover, horses that pay off early provide funding for yearling purchases in
subsequent years. For these reasons, buybacks could be selected because they are fast-
payback horses, even if they earn less in the long run (which might be discounted very
heavily).
To investigate this idea, we change the dependent variable to equal the horse’s racetrack
winnings as a two- and three-year old only and re-estimate equation (1). As column (1) of
Table 11 reveals, this modification effectively eliminates buyback under-performance: the
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estimated difference, while still negative, is now statistically significant at only the 18%
level.
However, we are doubtful that myopic preferences truly resolve the puzzle, for three
reasons. First, in contrast to the regression result, the median early earnings of non-
buybacks is approximately five times that of buybacks, a difference that is significant at
the 2% level. Second, the regression result itself is not robust: if, for example, we remove the
four horses with the highest levels of early earnings (three non-buybacks, one buyback), the
estimated buyback shortfall again becomes significantly negative at the 1% level. Third,
male-buyback under-performance persists (column (2) of Table 11). These contrasting
findings reflect the presence in our sample of a single buyback filly with very high early
earnings. Comparing medians, or eliminating this horse from the sample, or distinguishing
between male and female horses, all neutralize the impact of this horse and buyback under-
performance re-emerges.
4.4.2 Dynamic incentives
Rather than focussing excessively on the short-term, buyback decisions may instead be
motivated by longer-run considerations. For example, breeders may buy back some of their
horses mainly in order to retain some racing stock, which then allows them to mingle with,
and promote their business to, other horse owners at race meetings (while retaining the
option to race for high stakes if the horses prove to be fast enough). According to this
view, buyback activity is motivated by marketing factors that are only tangentially related
to immediate racetrack success.
Such an objective would require buyback horses to be frequent (if not successful) racers,
particularly as young horses. We therefore re-estimate equation (1) using two- and three-
year old race starts as the dependent variable and report the result in column (3) of Table
11. This shows that buyback horses average 1.14 fewer race starts (approximately 25%
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Table 11: Do Alternative Breeder Objectives Explain Buyback Under-Performance?
Dependent Variable: Early Early Race Career Career
Earnings Earnings Starts Earnings Earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Explanatory Variables:
Constant 9584∗∗∗ 10559∗∗∗ 4.339∗∗∗ 26303∗∗ 28299∗∗∗
(3175) (3298) (0.449) (11256) (10184)








Price 0.270∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗ 5.3E-05∗∗∗ 0.474∗∗∗ 0.471∗∗∗
(0.795) (0.794) (8.7E-06) (0.128) (0.129)
Export −9681∗∗∗ −9495∗∗∗ −2.983∗∗∗ −26197∗∗∗ −26191∗∗∗
(1838) (1766) (0.338) (3984) (4002)
Filly −892.8 −3121 −0.424 −11561∗∗∗ −11072∗∗∗





R2 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.03
F -statistic 8.15∗∗∗ 7.58∗∗∗ 16.6∗∗∗ 4.98∗∗∗ 6.26∗∗∗
Notes: All models allow for fixed auction time and location effects. Numbers in parentheses are robust
standard errors clustered at the breeder level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels respectively.
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less) than non-buybacks.12 Breeders apparently repurchase horses that are not only poorer
performers at the racetrack, but also set foot on it less often.
Another possibility is that, in order to preserve market share, professional breeders
respond to a perceived need to maintain a reputation for both quality and quantity of
auction offerings. This could provide an incentive for strategic behavior: offer a significant
number of horses for auction, but then discreetly repurchase those they believe to be of
low ability. Under this policy, a desire for repeat business sees breeders auction and then
repurchase horses that it would be cheaper in the short-term to leave at home. Such
a policy effectively selects low-ability horses as buybacks, potentially explaining buyback
under-performance.
This scenario implies that buyback under-performance should be more prevalent among
buybacks undertaken by professional breeders, since repeat business incentives matter less
to hobby or amateur breeders. We therefore include Breeder Sales (see section 2.2) in
our regression model and interact it with the buyback dummy. If breeder reputational
concerns drive buyback under-performance, then the buyback dummy coefficient should
become much closer to zero while the coefficient for the interaction term should be negative.
However, this is not the case (column (4) of Table 11): the absolute value of average
under-performance actually rises (to $11652) while the interaction coefficient estimate is
essentially zero. It therefore seems unlikely that buyback under-performance is due to
reputational concerns on the part of professional breeders.
4.4.3 Capital gains
We have defined buybacks as auction repurchases that breeders retain for racing and are
not on-sold post-auction. In practice though, some breeder repurchases of their own horses
could be undertaken with the intention of re-selling these horses privately at a higher price
12Over a full career, the absolute difference in starts is even greater, although less precisely estimated.
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(especially as they now have the added attraction of being qualified for the PGG Wrightson
series). Such post-auction behavior could cause our results to over-state the extent of
buyback under-performance. For example, this might arise if there were a selection bias in
our data — buybacks with the greatest promise are most easily on-sold, leaving breeders
in possession of less-promising types.
To address this issue, we redefine the buyback variable (Buyback–Resale), setting it
equal to 1 if the horse is repurchased by its breeder when sold at auction, regardless
of whether it is then retained for racing by the breeder or subsequently on-sold prior to
beginning a racing career. This results in a further 50 horses being categorized as buybacks.
These horses do perform somewhat better than the buybacks retained for racing, but the
difference is small: average career earnings of $15,580 for the on-sales compared to $12,667
for those retained (difference p-value = 0.49). The last column of Table 11 confirms that
this broader definition of buybacks leaves the under-performance phenomenon intact: the
estimated average shortfall is $9115, statistically significant at the 1% level.13
4.5 Behavioral biases
4.5.1 Over-confidence
Does buyback under-performance represent irrational over-buying by breeders? One obvi-
ous mechanism is overconfidence: the possession of private information may engender a level
13As a referee pointed out to us, secondary market purchases of buybacks could be particularly attractive
to financially-constrained buyers, for whom early-career earnings are most important. This suggests that,
after adjusting the buyback variable to account for on-selling, buyback under-performance should be less
apparent in early-career earnings. However, regressing Early Earnings on Buyback-Resale yields results
that are virtually identical to those discussed in section 4.4.1: although overall buyback under-performance
disappears (coefficient estimate = -3100; p-value = 0.14), this result is not robust, and male buyback under-
performance remains strong (coefficient estimate = -6908; p-value = 0.00).
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of confidence that is not justified by the information’s imperfect nature, and consequently
result in sub-optimal decisions. A large psychology literature documents a link between
information and overconfidence. For example, Fleisig (2011) finds that the provision of
poor information has the same positive impact on subject confidence as good information,
despite the latter being associated with significantly better performance. Similarly, Arkes
et al. (1986) report that subject confidence rises with information, but performance de-
clines, i.e., overconfidence increases. Many other studies obtain comparable results, e.g.,
Oskamp (1965), Hall et al. (2007) and Tsai et al. (2008). Moreover, overconfidence appears
to be greatest in situations where there is high residual uncertainty, e.g., Griffin and Tver-
sky (1992), Hayward et al. (2006). In addition, economics research has demonstrated the
deleterious impact of overconfidence on asset purchase decisions, e.g., Daniel et al. (1998),
Barber and Odean (1999, 2001). Together, these various lines of enquiry suggest that ad-
ditional information raises investor confidence, but that this confidence may be misplaced
if the information is incomplete, and that the resulting over-confidence leads to inferior in-
vestment decisions. In our setting, this implies a scenario in which breeders over-estimate
the precision of their information regarding their own horses, which in turn leads them to
disproportionately buy back horses that subsequently perform poorly.
To test this hypothesis, we require a proxy for overconfidence that is available in our
data. Barber and Odean (2001) and Levi et al. (2014) find that males typically suffer more
from overconfidence than females, so we classify yearling purchases according to the buyer
gender variable (Female Buyer) described in section 2.2. If buyback under-performance is
due to breeder over-confidence, and if our gender variable is a reasonable proxy for over-
confidence, then under-performance should be less apparent in buybacks undertaken by
female breeders.
To test this, we estimate a standard difference-in-difference specification of equation
(1) that includes the gender variable. However, this reveals (column (1) of Table 12) that
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buybacks by female breeders actually do worse on average (by $3729) than buybacks by
male breeders, although the difference is not statistically significant.14
4.5.2 Over-exuberance
Another possible form of over-confidence is over-exuberance in the auction process itself.
Perhaps buyback breeders are irrational auction participants, bidding too often or for too
long when their own stock enters the auction ring, thus resulting in the repurchase of too
many slow or over-priced horses. One way of investigating this idea is to compare buyback
purchases where the breeder is the auction bidder with buyback purchases conducted by
an agent acting on behalf of the breeder/bidder. If buyback under-performance is partly
due to over-exuberant bidding by buyback breeders, then the under-performance should be
less marked in cases where an agent is used.
To test this hypothesis, we estimate a difference-in-difference specification that interacts
Buyback with the Agent dummy introduced in section 2.2 (of the 117 yearling purchases
undertaken via an agent, 39 are buybacks). However, as can be seen in column (2) of Table
12, we find no evidence for the view that buyback under-performance is attributable to
poor auction strategies by breeders who engage in buybacks. Buyback horses purchased
using an agent actually perform worse than those obtained through the breeder bidding on
his own behalf, although the difference is statistically insignificant.
14We also experiment with an alternative characterization where a buyer is defined as female if and only
if all members of the buyer group are female (rather than 50% female), but this yields similar results. In
addition, we try two other proxies for over-confidence. First, whether or not the buyer is a professional
trainer, whose additional knowledge may render them excessively confident. Second, whether or not the
yearling has been nominated for another race series that requires periodic entry fees — not being nominated
would indicate a lack of confidence in the horse’s potential. However, neither of these are related to buyback
under-performance in our data.
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F -statistic 4.88∗∗∗ 4.94∗∗∗
Notes: The dependent variable is Career Earnings. All models allow for fixed auction year and location
effects. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the breeder level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
4.5.3 Emotional attachment
We also consider the possibility that buyback under-performance is due not to over-confidence,
but is instead the result of breeders succumbing to an emotional attachment to their own
horses. In other words, rather than letting horses they know have limited potential head
off to an uncertain future, breeders prefer to take them home. According to this view,
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buyback under-performance is in line with breeders’ expectations, and it is precisely these
low expectations that motivate buybacks.
Since any such attachment effect is likely to be considerably more powerful for smaller-
scale, hobby or amateur breeders than for large, professional breeding operations, an ob-
vious line of investigation is to test whether buyback under-performance is less marked
among horses repurchased by professional breeders. But as we have already seen (Table
11), this is not the case: buyback under-performance is similar in both large and small
breeding operations.
4.6 Breeder bidding strategies
Breeder bidding strategies could contribute to buyback under-performance via the infor-
mation it signals to potential buyers. If the signalling is honest, bidding on one’s own
yearlings potentially reveals positive information to outside buyers. That is, outside buyers
who observe breeders bidding on their own horses might implicitly “learn” about the breed-
ers’ private information.15 Then there are two possible responses. First, outside buyers are
encouraged to bid more aggressively and bid the horse price up. Second, outside buyers
are scared off because they fear having to pay too high a price.
Neither of these seems likely to explain buyback under-performance. With respect
to the first response, positive information about a horse can be concealed by employing
a bidding agent, but section 4.5.2 above shows that such repurchases are associated with
the same level of buyback under-performance. Moreover, while forcing buyback breeders to
15We are doubtful that much learning of this type can actually occur in practice. The auctions take
place in a large warehouse/barn area containing hundreds of people, and most yearlings are in the sales ring
for no more than 30 seconds. Based on conversations with industry participants, and our own observations,
we think most auction participants would have difficulty identifying a bidder as the horse’s breeder, or have
time to act on that information.
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pay a higher repurchase price could potentially explain under-performance as an investment
(lower Career Return), it cannot explain why buybacks are also poorer horses (lower Career
Earnings). Also, such an explanation is incapable of explaining the second buyback puzzle:
if breeder bidding reveals private information about female horses, then it should also reveal
private information about male horses, but, as we have seen, buyback under-performance
is concentrated in the latter group.
Turning to the second possible response, eliminating outside buyers means breeders face
less competition for their buybacks. But this should enable buyback breeders to concentrate
their efforts on those they believe to have the greatest ability and to repurchase such horses
at a lower price, i.e., buybacks should out-perform.
However, it is also possible that signalling could be misleading or incomplete. For ex-
ample, breeders may bid on their own horses in the hope of creating price support and
eliciting additional outside-bidder demand.16 Then, in those cases where outside buyers
recognise that the quality signal is false and fail to bid, breeders are left holding the baby.
Alternatively, optimal selling behaviour may require breeders to consistently bid on their
horses (see, for example, Bulow and Roberts, 1989). If outsiders have additional relevant
information about horse quality that is independent of breeder information, then buybacks
will typically occur when outsider information indicates low quality, resulting in little out-
side bidding interest. In both these cases, buybacks can disproportionately occur among
low-quality horses that subsequently under-perform.
If either phenomenon is present in our data, then we would expect to see buyback
under-performance concentrated among low-price horses: outsiders will not bid very much
on horses they believe to be of low quality, and so horses that attract little or no interest
(i.e., those that breeders end up with as buybacks under either of these strategies) are
unlikely to be associated with high prices. However, although buybacks do sell for lower
16This is sometimes known as shill bidding. See, for example, Chakraborty and Kosmopoulou (2004).
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prices on average (see Table 3), our data do not support the idea that buyback under-
performance is the result of this kind of selection bias. For example, splitting the sample
into price > median and price ≤ median groups sees buyback under-performance appearing
similarly in both. In the low-price group, the buyback coefficient estimate is -4959 (p-value
= 0.03); in the high-price group, it is -15296 (p-value = 0.01). Similarly, interacting the
auction price with the buyback dummy in the full-sample regression model also has little
effect: the buyback coefficient estimate is -10094 (p-value = 0.04) while the coefficient
estimate on the interaction variable is small (0.021) and statistically insignificant (p-value
= 0.95). In summary, buyback under-performance is not just a low-price phenomenon, and
thus seems unlikely to be the result of bidding strategies by breeders.
4.7 Input costs and quality
4.7.1 Economies of scope
Once purchased, an important determinant of horse performance is the quality of train-
ing it is given. Breeders who repurchase their own horses may also be tempted to realize
economies of scope by doing their own training rather than entrusting this task to a spe-
cialist trainer. Alternatively, breeders may be tied in to a particular training establishment
for business reasons that are unrelated to training quality. In either case, buyback horses
could receive inferior training, and hence under-perform.
To assess this idea, we proxy for trainer quality using a statistic, commonly used in the
industry to rank trainers and drivers, that measures the regularity with which the horse
finishes in a position that pays a significant stake to owners:
9 × number of firsts + 5 × number of seconds + 3 × number of thirds
9 × number of races during season
.
The “rewards” (9, 5 and 3) to finishing first, second and third respectively represent a
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longstanding industry convention about the relative merits of these placings.17 For each
trainer of a horse in our sample, we calculate the average of this ratio over the five seasons
prior to the horse’s auction date.18 For buybacks, mean trainer quality ratio is 0.20 and the
median is 0.19; for non-buybacks, the corresponding statistics are 0.21 and 0.22 respectively.
Although economically small, both differences are statistically significant at the 2% level or
better, consistent with buybacks receiving inferior training on average and suggesting that
trainer quality could indeed be an important omitted variable. However, when we include
the trainer quality proxy in our regression model (first column of Table 13), buyback under-
performance persists (estimated shortfall = −$9931; p-value = 0.03). Differences in the
quality of training cannot explain buyback under-performance.
4.7.2 Operating costs
Career earnings are a measure of gross returns to owners that take no account of the costs
incurred. If buybacks are less costly to own, then buyback under-performance could be
illusory.
Unfortunately, as noted in section 2.1, our available data contain no information on the
ongoing costs of racehorse ownership, e.g., food, veterinary bills, training fees, transport
costs. Nevertheless, their total value is likely to be closely related to the length of a horse’s
racing career. For a given price, a horse that wins $50,000 in a career lasting one season
will generally provide a much higher net return to owners than one that earns the same
amount over five seasons. Since buybacks have shorter racing careers than non-buybacks
17This convention is based on unpublished 1948 work by two New York teachers named Haswell and
Mead. For more details, see Boyle et al. (2010).
18For horses that changed trainer at some point, we employ a time-weighted average of the trainer quality
ratio. 532 horses in our sample have no recorded trainer, reducing the sample size to 1049. None of the
eliminated 532 ever started a race, suggesting they either showed insufficient ability to justify expenditure
on training fees or suffered a career-ending injury prior to entering training.
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Table 13: Do Differences in Input Costs or Quality Explain Buyback Under-Performance?
















F -statistic 5.00∗∗∗ 8.65∗∗∗
N 1049 1581
Notes: All models allow for fixed auction time and location effects. Numbers in parentheses are robust
standard errors clustered at the breeder level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels respectively.
on average (1.487 seasons versus 1.688; p-value = 0.04), their true respective performances
may be closer than is captured by career earnings alone.
To assess this idea, we create a new measure of performance: Earnings Per Season,
equal to Career Earnings divided by the number of seasons in which the horse raced (or
zero if the horse never raced). This alternative measure downgrades the weight accorded to
horses with long careers (and hence high operating costs) and upgrades that given to horses
with short careers (low operating costs). The mean value of Earnings Per Season in our
sample is $4507 for buybacks and $7463 for non-buybacks, a difference that is significant
at the 1% level. Similarly, the corresponding medians are $1011 and $1443, a difference
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that is significant at the 4% level. Turning to our regression model, the second column of
Table 13 shows that such differences persist after controlling for other variables: the average
Earnings Per Season shortfall for buybacks is -$2312 (p-value = 0.01).19 Thus, it appears
that buybacks also provide inferior net returns to owners: buyback under-performance is
not because of lower costs associated with owning buybacks.20
4.8 Divergence between price and opportunity cost
Thus far, we have implicitly assumed that the winning auction price represents the true
opportunity cost to the successful bidder. But in the case of buybacks, the winning bidder
is only out of pocket by an amount equal to 10% (the auctioneer commission rate) of the
price, since the remaining 90% is paid to himself. This raises the possibility that the price
paid for buybacks is an upwardly-biased estimate of future horse performance, which could
therefore explain the under-performance we observe.
Whether this is the case depends in the first place on the competitiveness of auction
bidding. If the breeder is the only bidder, then engaging in a buyback forgoes no other
comparable bid and the true cost faced by the breeder-buyer is only 10% of the official
price. In this case, auction price over-estimates the breeder’s cost of purchase, and hence
the horse’s expected performance. As a result, our regression analysis will be biased towards
19If horses with zero starts are excluded, the results are similar: the buyback coefficient estimate is
-$3541 (p-value = 0.05).
20A related measure is earnings per start: career earnings divided by the number of races in which the
horse competed. However, because the costs of food, training and veterinary care over a given time period
are incurred regardless of the number of times a horse starts during that period, racing frequency is a noisy
measure of costs — a horse that races 40 times over 5 seasons will cost its owners almost 5 times more
than a horse that races 40 times in just 1 season. Nevertheless, the results from using earnings per start
are similar: the mean value in our sample is $1495 for buybacks and $2069 for non-buybacks, a difference
that is significant at the 3% level.
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finding buyback under-performance.
To address this issue, we require, for buyback horses, a variable that equals auction price
if the auction is competitive and 10% of the price if it is not.21 Obviously, this requires
distinguishing between competitive and non-competitive auctions. Unfortunately, our data
do not contain any information on the number of bids each horse attracts, or any other
indicator of bidding competitiveness. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to presume that low
winning prices indicate a less competitive bidding process, since a prospective buyer will
succeed with a low bid only if there are no other bidders willing to offer more. Similarly, a
high price is likely to indicate a competitive auction, since few bidders will choose to offer
a higher price than necessary to win the auction. This suggests:
Opportunity Cost X =

Price, if horse is a Non-Buyback
Price, if horse is a Buyback and Price ≥ X
Price/10, if horse is a Buyback and Price < X
The choice of X is arbitrary, so we experiment with three alternative values: X = $5000
(approximately the 5th percentile of the auction price distribution), X = $10,000 (approx-
imately the 25th percentile), and X = $20,000 (approximately the 55th percentile).
As is apparent from columns (1) and (2) of Table 14, this adjustment has little effect
on estimated buyback under-performance for X = $5000 or X = $10,000: in both cases,
the average shortfall remains economically large and statistically significant at the 1%
level. Increasing X to $20,000 has a bigger effect: the average shortfall falls to $6387 and is
significant only at the 10% level. In principle, it seems that recognizing the true opportunity
costs involved in buybacks can at least partly explain buyback under-performance.
21As bidding follows an English auction process, the breeder’s winning bid in a competitive auction is
likely to be only marginally greater than the highest bid from an outsider, and hence closely approximate
the true opportunity cost.
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Table 14: Does a Divergence Between Price and Opportunity Cost Explain Buyback Under-
Performance?
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 28001∗∗∗ 28180∗∗∗ 28126∗∗∗ 30002∗∗∗
(10074) (10072) (10085) (10442)
Buyback −9579∗∗∗ −8621∗∗∗ −6387∗
(3122) (3208) (3498)
Export −26109∗∗∗ −26112∗∗∗ −26123∗∗∗ −25765∗∗∗
(3981) (3980) (3982) (3874)
Filly −11109∗∗∗ −11096∗∗∗ −11075∗∗∗ −15417∗∗∗
(3774) (3773) (3769) (5068)
Opportunity Cost 5K 0.475∗∗∗
(0.128)
Opportunity Cost 10K 0.469∗∗∗
(0.127)






R2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
F -statistic 6.27∗∗∗ 6.25∗∗∗ 6.30∗∗∗ 5.85∗∗∗
Notes: The dependent variable is Career Earnings. Opportunity Cost X equals Price/10 if the horse is
a buyback costing less than $X, otherwise it equals Price. All models allow for fixed auction time and
location effects. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the breeder level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗
and ∗ denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Yet we are skeptical that this is the case, for two reasons. First, X = $20,000 corre-
sponds to an auction price that is 1/3 greater than the sample median, and thus represents
a high threshold for a competitive auction: many multiple-bid auctions are likely to be
mis-classified as non-competitive. Second, even at this high threshold, the puzzling preva-
lence of male buyback under-performance remains — column (4) of Table 14 reveals that
the average male buyback shortfall is close to $15,000 and is statistically significant at the
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1% level. Thus, although the auction commission structure may have some explanatory
power for buyback under-performance in general, it cannot shed any light on male buyback
under-performance.
5 Concluding Remarks
Horse breeders surely don’t repurchase their own horses with the intention of losing money.
Yet the results of this paper indicate this is precisely what happens. Despite having superior
information, breeders seemingly make inferior investment decisions. Differences in risk, in
abilities, in input quality, and in costs cannot explain or justify this puzzling outcome. Nor
can alternative objectives or standard behavioral biases resulting from over-confidence,
emotional attachments, or over-exuberance. Adjusting for the true opportunity cost faced
by buyback bidders can explain some of the puzzle, but only with an adjustment that
almost certainly over-states the case. Most puzzling of all, buyback under-performance
is concentrated in male horses, which are primarily purchased for racing (as opposed to
breeding) purposes.
It would be interesting to see if a similar phenomenon arises in other common-value
auction markets. If so, other researchers may be able to provide an explanation and thus
succeed where we have failed. Until then, our results provide a reminder of the traditional
folklore claim that a little knowledge can be dangerous.
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